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INTRODUCTION
Current discussions about juvenile justice reveal a profound sense
of dissatisfaction. Many Americans believe that the country is in the
midst of a youth crime epidemic' and advocate swift implementation of
"get tough" policies in order to remove young offenders from society.2
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1. See Paul Marcotte, Criminal Kids, ABA J., Apr. 1990, at 61, 63 ("Nearly every poll
you read shows that people think juvenile crime is exploding.) (quoting Robert Shepherd,
Jr., director of the Youth Advocacy Clinic at the University of Richmond School of Law).
2. During the 1980s imprisonment rates rose dramatically. One commentator aptly
described the "get tough on crime" phenomenon by saying that, "[a]t the present rate of
growth, we will all be in prison in twenty-five years." Steven Duke, Clinton and Crime,
10 YALE J. ON REG. 575, 576 (1993).
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This punitive approach to juvenile crime continues to gain adherents,3
despite mounting evidence that disputes the premise that juvenile crime
is proliferating.4
The best evidence contradicts a popular belief that juvenile crime is
exploding. Not only has juvenile crime not risen for the past two
decades,5 but several indicators suggest that the rate of juvenile crime
has actually declined. Over the past decade, the total percentage of
juvenile arrests has dropped,6 including arrests for serious crimes.7
Despite these statistics, children are under attack from all sides. As
society gets tougher on youth, several jurisdictions have shifted away
from juvenile justice systems based on rehabilitation and moved toward
punitive models.8 As a result of the "criminalizing" of the juvenile
3. Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles. The
Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323
(1991) [hereinafter Forst & Blomquist, Cracking Down].
4. See infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. Such an overstatement of juvenile
crime statistics is parallelled only by the current understatement of youth victimization
statistics. The number of youth who are victims of violence, including those murdered,
continues to rise sharply. MICHAEL A. JONES & BARRY KRISBERG, IMAGES AND REALITY:
JUVENILE CRIME, YOUTH VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1-2, 19 (1994). Recent crime
statistics reveal that there are many more young victims of violent crimes than youths
committing violent crimes. Id. at 18-20 (noting that there are 14 youth victims of violent
crimes for every youth arrested for a violent crime).
Equally shocking, while most Americans believe that children are primarily victimized
by strangers and street gangs, the evidence actually indicates that parents and guardians
are responsible for most of the increased victimization of children and youth. Id.
5. JONES & KRiSBERG, supra note 4, at 8-20; see also Marcotte, supra note 1, at 63
("[In reality, serious juvenile crime is about the same or lower than it was 10 or 15 years
ago....').
6. In 1982, 18% of all arrests involved juveniles. JONES & KRISBERG, supra note 4,
at 10. By 1992, however, this percentage had dropped to 16%. Id.
7. Between 1982 and 1992, the percentage of serious crimes attributed to juveniles
decreased from 31% to 29%. Id.; see also Marcotte, supra note 1, at 63 ("In 1987, the
number of youths held for the most serious, violent offenses - murder, manslaughter,
robbery, aggravated assault - [was] down eight percent from 1985 and eleven percent
from 1983 ....").
8. See Richard Lawrence, Reexamining Community Corrections Models, 37 CRIME &
DELINQ. 449 (1991) (arguing that the emphasis on offender rehabilitation has been
replaced by focuses on punishment and community protection); Marcotte, supra note 1,
at 62-63 (describing the "criminalization" of the Delaware, California, Vermont, Illinois,
Montana, Georgia, Mississippi, and New York juvenile systems). See generally BARRY
C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, 262-95 (1993) [hereinafter FELD, JUSTICE FOR
CHILDREN]; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
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justice system, children are increasingly removed from the juvenile
justice system to the adult criminal courts.9
Some children are sentenced to adult correctional facilities and
detention centers, despite federal and state prohibitions against such
practices.'0 Others are placed in nonpenal settings such as psychiatric
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U.L. REV. 821, 841-42 (1988) [hereinafter
Feld, Principle of Offense]; Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75
MINN. L. REV. 691, 708-10 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Court]; Forst & Blomquist,
Cracking Down, supra note 3; Martin L. Forst et al., Punishment, Accountability and the
New Juvenile Justice, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. no. 1, at I.
9. For a review of the general move toward criminalizing the juvenile court system,
see Feld, Juvenile Court, supra note 8, at 708-10 (reviewing four developments which
have led to the criminalizing of the juvenile court: removal of status offenders, waiver of
serious offenders to the adult system, increased punitiveness in sentencing delinquents, and
more formal procedures). See also JONES & KRISBERG, supra note 4, at 21-35 (detailing
how the juvenile court system has gotten tougher on youth). See generally FELD, JUSTICE
FOR CHILDREN, supra note 8, at 262-95; IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES:
RETmKiNG THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1989) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ,
(IN)JuSTICE]; Barry C. Feld, The Punitive Juvenile Court and the Quality of Procedural
Justice: Disjunctions Between Rhetoric and Reality, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 443 (1990)
[hereinafter Feld, Punitive Juvenile Court]; National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
Policy Statement on Children in Jails, 32 CRiME & DELINQ. 395 (1986); Ira M. Schwartz
et al., The Jailing of Juveniles in Minnesota: A Case Study, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 133
(1988); Mark Soler, Litigation on Behalf of Children in Adult Jails, 34 CRIME & DELINQ.
190 (1988).
Indeed, some commentators even advocate dismantling the juvenile courts. See Janet
E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for
Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1083, 1121-32 (1991) (arguing that
abolishing the juvenile court will lead to increased protection, by making jury trials
available, achieving effective assistance of counsel, and meeting the dispositional needs
of juveniles); Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Rethinking the Juvenile Justice
System, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 262, 269 (1993) (arguing that the juvenile court should be
replaced by the adult criminal justice system).
10. For example, the practice of placing of juveniles in adult facilities was recently
castigated by the Nebraska legislature. Juvenile Services Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2403
(Supp. 1990) ("[Ijncarceration ofjuveniles in adult jails, lockups, and correctional facilities
is contrary to the best interests and well-being ofjuveniles and frequently inconsistent with
state and federal law requiring intervention by the least restrictive method."). The practice
itself, however, has been well documented. See generally Forst & Blomquist, Cracking
Down, supra note 3, at 323. One report, based on data from the federal government's
Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, reported that admission of committed
juveniles to adult detention centers increased by 600% between 1977 and 1986. Ira M.
Schwartz et al., Business as Usual: Juvenile Justice During the 1980s, 5 NOTRE DAME
J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 377, 383-87 (1991). Such statistics underscore the concern
that detention facilities are inappropriately used as dispositional options for adjudicated
juveniles. Id. Even status offenders continue to be warehoused in secure correctional
1995]
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hospitals or foster homes." Even those who have not committed any
offenses are sometimes incarcerated in adult jails, simply because they
are victims and the state has no alternative placement available."
Those who are not removed from the juvenile justice system do not
necessarily fair better than their counterparts. Juvenile courts are as
punitive, and in some cases more so, than criminal courts. 3
In the face of the prevailing punitive, remove-from-family ethos,
there is a growing consensus among policy makers that the family is the
most effective vehicle for dealing with troubled youth.'4 The progress
of this burgeoning movement is illustrated by the recent promulgation of
several state Family Preservation or Family Policy Acts. These acts
highlight the importance of families and prefer forms of state intervention
that keep children in their homes. 5 This community-based, family-
facilities. Status Offenders: Risks and Remedies, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Juvenile Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. 64-75
(1991) (statement of Gary B. Melton on Behalf of the American Psychological
Association) [hereinafter Melton Statement]; see id. at 71 (noting that "thousands of
children and youth charged with status offenses are confined each day in secure detention
facilities - youth jails").
11. See Melton Statement, supra note 10, at 72-73. See generally Beverly Balos & Ira
M. Schwartz, Psychiatric and Chemical Dependency Treatment of Minors: The Myth of
Voluntary Treatments and the Capacity to Consent, 92 DIcK. L. REv. 631 (1988); Marilyn
Jackson-Beeck et al., Trends and Issues in Juveniles Confinement for Psychiatric and
Chemical Dependency Treatment, 10 INT'L. J.L. & PSYCH. 153 (1987); Ira M. Schwartz,
Hospitalization ofAdolescents for Psychiatric and Substance A buse Treatment: Legal and
Ethical Issues, 10 J. ADOL. HEALTH CARE 1 (1989).
12. Melton Statement, supra note 10, at 71 ("[H]undreds are confined each day without
even the pretense of a status offense. They are acknowledged to be incarcerated simply
because they are victims, and an alternative emergency placement is unavailable.").
13. See JONEs & KRJSBERG, supra note 4, at 4, 19-36; see also id. at 4, 24-26 (noting
that conviction rates in juvenile courts tend to surpass those in adult criminal courts).
14. Several new statutes may be interpreted to extend in-home family preservation
efforts to juvenile delinquents. For example, Nebraska's new family policy statute covers
judicial action taken in light of law violations. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-532(2) (1993). It
commands: "[jE]very reasonable effort shall be made to provide [required governmental]
assistance in the least intrusive and least restrictive method consistent with the needs of
the child and to deliver such assistance as close to the home community of the child...
requiring assistance as possible." Id. Similar statutes exist in the following states:
Florida, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey,
Montana, Missouri, and Arizona. See infra part IV.
15. Indeed, some statutes ekpressly find that intensive family preservation efforts
should be made to keep juvenile delinquents in their homes. These states include
Tennessee, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, North Carolina and West Virginia. See infra
[Vol. 48:87
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focused approach is momentous and reflects a general transformation in
the administration of child protective services.
A close reading of the new child welfare provisions reveals
language that essentially covers the entire range of governmental and
legal actions aimed at families. 6 States have not, however, wholeheart-
edly committed to including delinquent youth in the new family
preservation effort. 7 Admittedly, in-home dispositions should not be
made in three instances: 1) when a youth has committed an especially
heinous crime; 2) when a youth is a chronic and serious offender; or 3)
when a youth is dangerous to himself or others. 8 However, because
part IV.B.
16. For example, Nebraska's family preservation statute "declare[s] a family policy
[designed] to guide the actions of state government in dealing with the problems and crises
involving children and families." NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-532(1) (1993). It further states:
The policy set forth in this subsection shall be (a) interpreted in conjunction with all
relevant laws, rules, and regulations of the state and shall apply to all children and
families who have need of services or who, by their circumstances or actions, have
violated the laws, rules, or regulations of the state and are found to be in need of
treatment or rehabilitation and (b) implemented through the cooperative efforts of
state, county, and municipal governments, legislative, judicial, and executive branches
of government, and other public and private resources.
Id. § 43-532(2).
17. See infra Part IV.
18. For example, NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-532(3) (1993) states a legislative preference
for keeping troubled children in their homes or communities, unless issues of safety are
implicated. § 43-532(3) (stating that the statute "shall not be construed to mean that a
child shall be left in the home when it is clearly shown that continued residence in the
home places the child at greater risk than removal from the home does"). This provision,
added as an amendment in 1989, indicates the legislature's concern for safety issues (e.g.,
the safety of a child in his or her home in the wake of abuse or neglect allegations). There
is no reason to assume that the legislature intended for juveniles who pose risks to public
safety to remain at home.
Many juvenile justice professionals prefer to remove potentially dangerous juveniles
from their homes. The authors caution against predicating out-of-home placements on
predictions of future dangerousness. Such predictions tend to be wrong more often than
right. See, e.g., Charles Patrick Ewing, Preventive Detention and Execution: The
Constitutionality of Punishing Future Crimes, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 139, 141-46
(1991). Nevertheless, the legal system functions as if "there is nothing inherently
unattainable about a prediction of future dangerousness." See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 278 (1984) (stating that one ground for detention prior to adjudication hearing is the
likelihood of the juvenile's future dangerousness); see also United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that preventive detention of criminal defendant based on a
prediction of dangerousness is constitutional); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)
(permitting considerations of future dangerousness as part of death penalty determination).
19951
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most juveniles within the juvenile justice system have not committed
serious crimes and have not previously committed serious felonies, 9
out-of-home dispositions should occur relatively infrequently. Unfortu-
nately, out-of-home placements continue."
The new family policy statutes provide an opportunity for policy
makers to rethink the current direction of juvenile justice. Applying the
family preservation movement to the juvenile justice context would entail
redirecting efforts from punishment to rehabilitation, the very raison
d'etre of the juvenile court.2 As a result, youth would be rehabilitated
19. In a recent national survey, the U.S. Department of Justice reported that only 6%
of youth referred to juvenile courts for criminal law violations were charged with violent
crimes. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, OJJDP UPDATE ON STATISTICS 2 (1989); see also INSTTrE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS,
STANDARDS RELATING To DISPOSITIONS 34 (1980); JONES & KRISBERG, supra note 4, at
10 (noting that property offenses represented 85% of all juvenile arrests for serious crimes
in 1992; murder and rape combined represented less than half of one percent of all
juvenile arrests in that same year).
20. How many youth are sent to institutions, on a national level, remains unknown.
Paul Lerman, Counting Youth in Institutions: Bringing the United States Up To Date, 37
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 465,465 (1991); PAUL LERMAN, COUNTING YOUTH IN TROUBLE
LIvING AWAY FROM HOME: RECENT TRENDS AND COUNTING PROBLEMS (Center for the
Study of Youth Policy 1990); Jackson-Beeck, et al., supra note 11, at 153. There have
been attempts to collect national data on the number of children in institutions. Eg.,
Children in Care Data Collection Act of 1990, H.R. 5627, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990).
Additionally, essentially no reliable national statistics exist for out-of-home placements.
One national study found that 22% of violent offense cases and 11% of nonviolent offense
cases resulted in youth being placed outside the home. OJJDP UPDATE ON STATISTICS,
supra note 19, at 3. However, states vary in use of out-of home placement. In some
states, as few as 10% and in others more than 40% of youth charged with a violent crime
were placed out of the home. Id.
21. See Richard G. Wiebush, Juvenile Intensive Supervision: The Impact on Felony
Offenders Diverted From Institutional Placement, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 68, 68-69 (1993)
(examining the feasibility of using intensive supervision programs for serious juvenile
offenders); Dan MaCallair, Reaffirming Rehabilitation in Juvenile Justice, 25 YOUTH &
SOCIETY 104, 104-05 (1993); see also W. Wesley Johnson et al., The Goals of Community-
Based Corrections:An Analysis of State Legal Codes, 18 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 79, 89 (1993)
(reviewing legislative mandates and concluding that "the rehabilitative ideal continues to
survive").
The difference between criminal and juvenile courts has been that the former punishes
while the latter rehabilitates. This distinction has been given the Supreme Court's
imprimatur. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1967) (recapitulating the history of the
juvenile justice system's separate function); see also United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct.
1329, 1343 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the focus of juvenile sentencing
proceedings is still on treatment); McKeiverv. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1971)
[Vol. 48:87
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within their families and communities instead of being incarcerated in
adult jails or institutionalized.
This Article examines the soundness of the new family and
community based juvenile justice system. Part I examines the punitive
zeitgeist that has developed within the juvenile justice system. Part II
then examines juveniles' legal rights to in-home services and concludes
that while juveniles may not have an affirmative right to in-home
services, they do have liberty interests that protect against unnecessary
removals from their homes. Part I details the reasons for directing
efforts and resources to support family-based services for delinquent
youth. This section explores the problems with current out-of-home
placements, policy concerns favoring in-home placements, and the cost-
benefit effectiveness of in-home placement programs. Part IV then
provides an overview of the new family preservation statutes. These
statutes highlight the often self-defeating effect of "defamilization" and
state legislatures' interests in nonpunitive approaches to children who
require state intervention. Finally, Part V concludes that the new child
protection movement should not ignore delinquent youth and cautions
against creating the type of boilerplate statutes that have historically
plagued the juvenile justice system.'
(White, J., concurring) (discussing the differences between the juvenile justice system's
focus on rehabilitation and timely reunification with the offender's family, and the criminal
justice system's focus on punishment and retribution); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 79
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that the object of the juvenile court is to correct conditions,
while the purpose of the criminal court is convict and punish for criminal action).
22. For example, all states already provide for in-home placements of juvenile
offenders as dispositional alternatives. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-71 (Supp. 1994); ALASKA
STAT. § 47.10.080 (Supp. 1994); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-241 (Supp. 1994); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(3)(B) (Michie 1993); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 840-42 (West
1984 & Supp. 1995); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-703(1)(f) (West 1990 & Supp. 1994);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-140(a) (West Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 937(b)(2) (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2320(a)(1) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.054(1)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-35 (1994); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 571-48(1)(A) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 16-1814 (Supp. 1994); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
705, para. 3-24(1)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-15A(3) (Bums Supp.
1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.101 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1601 (1993); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 635.060 (Baldwin Supp. 1994); LA. CHILDRENS' CODE, art. 897
(felony offenses) (West 1995); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE, art. 899 (misdemeanor offenses)
(West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 7002 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); MD.
CODE ANN., CTs. & JuD. Poc. § 3-820(c)(1) (1989); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119,
§ 58 (West 1993); MICH. COhe. LAWS ANN. § 712A.18(1)(b) (West Supp. 1994); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.185 (1)(b) (West Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN., § 43-21-605(1)(b),
43-23-17(a) (1981 & Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.181(1) (1994); MONT. CODE
1995]
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I. RETHINKING THE GET TOUGH ZEITGEIST: THE NEW CHILD
PROTECTION MOVEMENT
The ethos in family and child welfare services continues to move
toward family preservation and family support.' This movement
toward collaboration, coordination, and integration of services aimed at
preserving family integrity appears in virtually every domain of child and
family services.' One of the most remarkable aspects of this new
approach to child welfare, however, is the apparent exclusion of juvenile
offenders
ANN. § 41-5-523(1) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-246(4) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 62.211(l)(a) (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:19.I(a) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4A-43(b)(2) (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-19.B(3) (Michie 1993);
N.Y. JuD. LAW § 352.2.2(b) (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-647 (Supp.
1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-31.1 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.355(A)(1) (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 11 16.A.1 (Supp. 1995); OR.
REV. STAT. § 419.507(l)(a) (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 6352(a) (West Supp. 1994);
RI. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-32 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1330(a) (Law. Co-op Supp.
1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-7A-90 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-
129(e)(2) (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04(d)(1)(A) (West 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-3a-39(2)(b) (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN., tit 33, § 5529(a)(1) (Supp. 1994); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.A.2 (Michie 1988); WASH. ANN. REv. CODE § 13.34.130(l)(a)
(West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-13(b)(2) (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.34(2m)
(1987); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-229(b)(iv) (1994). However, this alternative is hardly
taken seriously.
23. For a description of the rise and current status of the family preservation
movement, see Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform:
Revolutionalizing the Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1
(1995) [hereinafter Levesque, The Failures ofFoster Care Reform]. For the most eloquent
and detailed proposal for child protection, see U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NEIGHBORS HELPING NEIGHBORS: A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN (1993); see also PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT (Gary B.
Melton & Frank D. Barry, eds., 1994) (containing a series of essays detailing effective
child maltreatment prevention and treatment models and offering concrete strategies to
create a society-wide safety net for children).
24. Gary B. Melton, Is There a Place for Children in the New World Order?, 7 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 491, 514 (1993) [hereinafter Melton, New World Order].
25. Despite this exclusion, it is important to note that family preservation efforts
directed towards early childhood intervention have shown promise in preventing juvenile
delinquency. See Edward Zigler et al., Early Childhood Intervention: A Promising
Preventative for Juvenile Delinquency, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 997, 999-1004 (1992)
(reviewing six major longitudinal studies of early childhood intervention programs and
suggesting that they help reduce future delinquency); see also Kevin N. Wright & Karen
E. Wright, A Policy Maker's Guide to Controlling Delinquency and Crime Through Family
Interventions, 11 JUST. Q. 189, 192-201 (1994) (arguing that programs aimed at
[Vol. 48:87
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States' decisions to exclude troubled youth from the new family
preservation statutes originate in the "get tough" attitude that prevails in
the current fight against crime. Those in charge of the juvenile justice
system do not want to appear "soft" on crime.26 They remain captive
to public misperceptions of violent youth and to increasingly strict
legal edicts. Conforming to the punitive ethos, juvenile court judges
continue to remove delinquents from their homes and warehouse them
in correctional facilities and nonpenal settings such as psychiatric
hospitals or foster homes.29 Few judges utilize in-home placement
alternatives for nondangerous juveniles.3"
I. EXTENDING THE FAMILY PRESERVATION MOVEMENT TO JuvENILE
JUSTICE: FEDERAL JURISPRUDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASES
Several obstacles block extending the family preservation movement
to the juvenile justice system. The Supreme Court has long held that
individuals have no general right to services in community settings, and
that states have "no constitutional duty to provide substantive services
within [their] borders."' Moreover, children have essentially no federal
legislative right to services. 2 However, these obstacles are not
strengthening families will also reduce the factors in children's lives that place them at
higher risk for delinquency and later criminality).
26. Several commentators have noted the constraint that "fear of scandal" imposes on
juvenile court dispositions. Fear of scrutiny increases pressures to impose maximum
restraints on offenders; anything less exposes the court to criticism, especially when
recurrence of serious illegal activity inevitably creates the impression that previous
dispositions were too lenient. See Feld, The Principle of Offense, supra note 8, at 886;
Feld,Juvenile Courtsupra note 8, at 714; see also Margaret Bortner, Traditional Rhetoric,
Organizational Realities: Removal of Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 53,
68-70 (1986).
27. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
28. See generally, Feld, Juvenile Court, supra note 8 (reviewing four developments
which have led to the criminalizing of the juvenile court: removal of status offenders,
waiver of serious offenders to the adult system, increased punitiveness in sentencing
delinquents, and more formal procedures).
29. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
31. Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982). For an examination of the right
to services in a community setting, see Michael L. Perlin, Law and the Delivery of Mental
Health Services in the Community, 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 194, 194-205 (1994).
32. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the lack of federal right to services in Suter
v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (denying children supervised by a state child welfare
19951
Washington University Open Scholarship
96 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
determinative. Despite the apparent lack of constitutional and federal
legislative rights to services, states remain free to expand federal
rights.33 More importantly, although "affirmative" rights may not force
states to extend the family protection movement to the juvenile justice
system, "negative" rights remain a viable tool. 4
The United States is increasingly taking children's negative rights
seriously.3s In the context of institutional confinement, these rights
include the freedom of movement, association, and communication.36
For example, the Supreme Court has stated that children, like adults,
agency a private cause of action under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980 to compel state administration of federally mandated services on grounds that
children under its supervision, as well as children in foster care, lack adequate standing to
bring suit to enforce the Act's provisions); see Levesque, Failures of Foster Care Reform,
supra note 23, at 20-22; see also Roger J.R. Levesque, International Children's Rights
Grow Up: Implications for American Jurisprudence and Domestic Policy, 24 CAL. W.
INT'L L. J. 193, 232-35 (1994) [hereinafter Levesque, Children's Rights Grow Up]
(concluding that "the Constitution imposes no affirmative duty on the government to
safeguard any children's rights - even the paramount right to life itself' and noting that
the federal legislature has yet to remedy this limitation by imposing affirmative obligations
on states).
33. For example, several lower courts have held that there is a right to treatment for
institutionalized juveniles. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977);
Pena v. New York State Division for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Morales
v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev d,
430 U.S. 322 (1977), remanded, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g, 569 F. Supp. 332
(E.D. Tex. 1983); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I.
1972).
34. See Levesque, Children's Rights Grow Up, supra note 32, at 227-35 (detailing the
distinction between positive and negative rights and the growth and current statement of
children's rights, both internationally and domestically).
35. See generally Levesque, Children's Rights Grow Up, supra note 32; Roger J.R.
Levesque, The Internationalization of Children's Human Rights: Too RadicalforAmerican
Adolescents?, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 237 (1995) [hereinafter Levesque, American
Adolescents]; Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68
NEB. L. REV. 146 (1989); Gary B. Melton, Promoting Children's Dignity through Mental
Health Services, in UNITED NATIONs CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: IMPAcT
ON UNITED STATES LAW (Cynthia P. Cohen & Howard A. Davidson, eds. 1990)
[hereinafter Melton, Promoting Children's Dignity]; Gary B. Melton, Socialization In the
Global Community: Respectfor the Dignity of Children, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 66 (1991).
36. Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of
Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773, 797 (1988) (arguing that children
have a right not to be confined and that confinement constitutes a severe restriction of
individual liberty).
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have a "substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for
medical treatment."3  The same liberty interests are at stake in
delinquency proceedings. 8  Taking these rights seriously requires
confinement of juvenile offenders to be viewed as a last resort.
Federal legislative action has expanded the bundle of rights
implicated when children are removed from home. Federal law mandates
using the least restrictive measures to remedy juvenile problems prior to
removing children from their homes.39 In addition, several state statutes
governing the institutionalization of minors mandate consideration of the
least restrictive alternatives before removing children from their
homes.' Proper respect for a juvenile's rights requires the consider-
ation of the least restrictive alternatives before infringing upon his liberty
and freedom to stay in his home and community.
In addition to constitutional and legislative mandates that protect the
dignity and rights of juveniles, parental and family rights weigh heavily
in favor of in-home solutions to juvenile justice problems.41 Although
the balancing of the child's, parent's, and state's interests places a
substantial priority on the child's best interests,42 the Supreme Court has
clearly stated that parents have primacy in child-rearing.43 The Court
37. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
38. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1967). There is no bar to extending constitutional
protections to children because "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone." 1d. at 13.
39. See Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform, supra note 23, at 13-20
(detailing the federal manifestation of this trend). The most obvious federal mandate
derives from the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. For a detailed
analysis of the Act, its failures and recommendations for reform, see id. at 13-22.
40. Weithorn, supra note 36, at 796-97.
41. See Gary B. Melton, Law and Random Events: The State of Child Mental Health
Policy, 10 INT'L J. OF L. & PsYCHIATRY 81, 86 (1987) [hereinafter Melton, Child Mental
Health Policy] (noting that a trnd toward family autonomy is one of many trends involved
in the reevaluation of childrens' rights).
42. See Prince v Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). For an elaborate
explanation of children's rights, see generally Levesque, Children's Rights Grow Up, supra
note 32, at 202-08 (examining the balancing of interests when children's rights are
involved).
43. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("This primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition."); Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(recognizing the right of parents to "direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control," free from unreasonable interference by the state).
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has further found that parents' liberty interests in the care, custody, and
management of their children are of fundamental importance.44 The
Court has affirmed that state intervention directed toward the family
should focus on rehabilitation and recognize that "parents retain a vital
interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.'45
Indeed, the Court has specifically stated that the family as a unit is to be
allocated a recognized interest.'
III. REASONS FOR ADOPTING IN-HOME SOLUTIONS
FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE
A. Treatment Rationales
Besides looking to constitutional and legislative innovations in child
welfare to support a move toward in-home solutions, the traditional
nature of the juvenile court supports rehabilitation rather than punish-
ment. Although juvenile courts have increasingly moved toward
punishment of "wayward youth," 47 rehabilitation and treatment continue
to be major goals.48  Indeed, the ultimate goal of juvenile court inter-
vention remains rehabilitating minors and returning them to their families. 49
44. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)
(stating that previous cases have "made plain beyond the need for multiple citation" that
the parental rights deserve deference "absent a powerful countervailing interest").
45. Santosky v Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (holding a state intervention into parental notification
rights unconstitutional); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (recognizing parents' interests in
preserving the integrity of family); Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The
Problem With the Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 HAM. J. PuB. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 23-
31 (detailing the importance and tenacity of the family paradigm in American law).
46. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 165 (detailing the "sacred private interests"
of parents' household); see also Roger J. R. Levesque, The Supreme Court, U.S.
Constitution, andFamilyLife, Paper Presented to the Second International Interdisciplinary
Study Group on Ideologies of Children's Rights, May 14, 1994, Charleston, South Carolina
4-7 (examining the Supreme Court's ideology of family life).
47. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. It is necessary to focus on
rehabilitation, because very little attention and few federal, state, or local dollars, have
been targeted toward prevention. Juvenile Justice: A New Focus on Prevention: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Juvenile Justice, 102nd
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992) (opening statement of Sen. Kohl) [hereinafter Kohl Testimony].
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In addition to clashing with the traditional goals of the juvenile
courts, current out-of-home placements are outdated. Placing children in
foster care" and using psychiatric hospitalization are no longer viable
options."' Perhaps more alarming, society has yet to feel the destructive
effect of the distorted messages out-of-home placements send juveniles
about themselves, their families, and the justice system. 52  Taking
rehabilitation and treatment seriously entails making meaningful attempts
to provide effective services when and where they are most needed:
when troubled youth have been identified and, where appropriate, in their
own families or communities.
Although several states' statutes now reflect the general move
toward noninstitutional placements for juvenile offenders,53  few
50. See generally Levesque, Failures of Foster Care, supra note 23 (documenting the
extent and roots of the current foster care crisis).
51. Psychiatric hospitalization of juvenile offenders is often a gross misuse of the
mental health system. See Weithorn, supra note 36, at 783-95 (arguing that most
adolescents in inpatient psychiatric facilities are inappropriately institutionalized and that
the treatment is less effective and more costly than are community-based alternatives); see
also 131 CONG. REC. 15,141 (1985) (testimony of Ira M. Schwartz, senior fellow at the
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, at the University of Minnesota, Before the Select
Comm. on Children, Youth and Families) (stating that adolescent admission rates to private
psychiatric facilities increased by nearly 350% between 1980 and 1984; and 40% were
unnecessarily admitted or admitted for too long); Evelyn C. Knaverhause, Comment, The
Federal Circle Game: The Precarious Constitutional Status of Satus Offenders, 7 COOLEY
L. REV. 31, 47-48 (1990) (stating that too many children who do not need care are
admitted to psychiatric facilities, while too few of the children in need receive necessary
care).
52. See Ainsworth, supra note 9, at 1119-21 (1991) (arguing that as the juvenile courts
lose legitimacy, the legal socialization of youth breaks down; if juveniles see the system
as unjust, they will not adopt the system's rule as their own). For general discussions of
the role that symbolism plays in juvenile law, see Gary B. Melton, The Clashing of
Symbols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsT 345 (1987); Melton,
Child Mental Health Policy, supra note 41; Gary B. Melton, The Significance of Law in
the Everyday Lives of Children and Families, 22 GA. L. REV. 851 (1988).
53. For example, in 1990, the Nebraska Unicameral Legislature passed the Juvenile
Services Act NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-2401 to -2414 (1993 & Supp. 1994). The Act
provides aid (financial and otherwise) to communities that are willing to develop local
facilities and programs to achieve several objectives, including: the least restrictive and
most effective intervention necessary for delinquent juveniles, alternatives to secure
detention, and alternatives to geographically remote and more restrictive institutionaliza-
tion. Id. §§ 43-2403(b), (d) & (e).
The program reflects a national trend, as reflected in the Juvenile Justice Standards
promulgated by the Institute for Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association.
The authors stated a clear preference to maintain juveniles at home whenever possible.
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programs actually allow in-home placements for nondangerous juveniles.
Despite the paucity of existing programs, sound reasons exist for taking
more seriously the burgeoning movement away from punishment and
diverting resources to family and community based programs.
A major obstacle in treating troubled youth has been the belief that
their families are necessarily dysfunctional.' This notion has led to the
unfortunate conclusion that delinquent youth should not remain in their
homes. However, there is no reason to believe that juvenile justice
intervention should serve purposes different from any other treatment:
either returning clients home or placing them in suitable community
settings.
Additionally, the perception that delinquent youth are essentially
dysfunctional and in need of "defamilization"' 5 simply ignores the fact
that youth are as heterogeneous as their families.5 6 Moreover, because
juvenile crime necessarily results from individual, family, and environ-
"Removal from home is the most severe disposition authorized for adjudicated juveniles.
As such, it should be reserved for the most serious or repetitive offenses, and rarely if
ever, used for youngerjuveniles." INSTITUrT OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATINo TO DISPOSMONS 62 (1980);
see also Schwartz, et al., supra note 10, at 378-81.
54. Marvin D. Free, Jr., Clarifying the Relationship Between the Broken Home and
Juvenile Delinquency: A Critique of the Current Literature, 12 DEVIANT BEHAV. 109, 161
(1991) (stating that although "the literature fails to provide evidence supportive of a
relationship between the broken home and serious delinquency.., and that no conclusions
can be drawn about the impact of the broken home on recidivism," there are still links
between the nonintact home and status offenses, such as running away, truancy, and
discipline problems in school); Katherine M. Wood, The Family of the Juvenile
Delinquent, 41 JUv. & FAM. Cr. J. No. 1, at 19, 20 (1990) ("Few view the family as
possibly capable of a partnership role in the rehabilitative plan for the youth. Indeed, the
family is frequently made the scape goat.').
55. Wood, supra note 54, at 19-20; see also Down These Mean Streets: Violence by
and Against America's Children: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Children,
Youth, and Families, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 51, 53 (1989) (statement of Deborah Meier,
Principal, Central Park East Secondary School in New York City) ("[T]he punitive
reluctant quality of our public welfare programs has to be changed .... ."); Robert W.
Sweet, Jr., Strengthening Our Families, Fortijying Our Nation, 42 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. No.
3, at 1 (1991) (discussing the prevailing perception that delinquent youth are dysfunction-
al).
56. The juvenile justice system has traditionally failed to distinguish between
individuals and instead "lump[s] together children of very different stripes and patterns."
LAWRENcE M. FRmDMAN, CRIM AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN ISTORY 414 (1993);
see also id. at 163-66, 413-17, 426-27 (examining the tendency to lump bad and bad-off
children together).
[Vol. 48:87
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol48/iss1/3
REVISIONING JUVENILE JUSTICE
mental factors," it is unwise to attempt to prevent juvenile crime by
removing juveniles from the conditions to which they will eventually
return."' Because families and communities contribute significantly to
juveniles' troubling behavior, family counseling remains the most
effective method for treating juvenile offenders.59  Indeed,
57. Although people are quick to blame the individual for wrongdoings, overwhelming
evidence suggests that delinquent behavior is associated with characteristics of the social
systems in which adolescents are embedded. A growing body of research indicates that
antisocial behavior is related to important characteristics of the individual youth, family,
peer system, school system, and community. See generally ScoTT W. HENGGELER,
DELINQUENCY IN ADOLESCENCE (1989) [hereinafter HENGGELER, DELINQUENCY]; ALAN
E. KAZDIN, CONDUCT DISORDERS IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE (1987); Magda
Stouthamer-Loeber & Rolf Loeber, The Use of Prediction Data in Understanding
Delinquency, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 333 (1988).
58. "Little evidence supports the long-term efficacy of [incarceration or foster care]
placements." Scott W. Henggeler et al., Family Preservation Using Multisystemic
Therapy: An Effective Alternative to Incarcerating Serious Juvenile Offenders, 60 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 953, 954 (1992) [hereinafter Henggeler et al.,
Family Preservation]. Recent studies show that in-home programs, even for serious
offenders, are at least as effective as programs committing youths to the state. William
H. Barton & Jeffrey A. Butts, Viable Options: Intensive Supervision Programs for Juvenile
Delinquents, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 238, 251 (1990).
As a result, services to children and families are likely to be effective "when they are
delivered in 'natural' settings like the home and the school, and when they are not
confined to measured units of service (e.g., fifty minutes of psychotherapy) but instead are
delivered when and where people need them." Melton, New World Order, supra note 24,
at 496. See generally SCOTr W. HENGELER & CHARLES M. BoRDuIN, FAMILY THERAPY
AND BEYOND: A MULTISYSTEMIC APPROACH TO TREATING THE BEHAvIOR PROBLEMS
OF CHILDREN AND ADOLEsCEN (1990); Gary B. Melton, It's Time for Neighborhood
Research and Action, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 909 (1992).
59. Experts agree that fimily-based intervention represents the most promising
treatment for adolescents with antisocial behavior. See Albert R. Roberts & Michael J.
Camasso, The Effect of Juvenile Offender Treatment Programs on Recidivism: A Meta-
Analysis of 46 Studies, 5 NoTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 421, 437-38 (1991)
("The primary finding of this quantitative meta-analysis of 46 studies is that one treatment
modality with adjudicated delinquents, family counseling, does appear... effective in
reducing recidivism for at least one year post-treatment."). Likewise, family intervention
has received wide endorsement as a locus for preventive intervention, especially primary
intervention. See Alan E. Kazdin, Treatment ofAntisocial Behavior in Children: Current
Status and Future Directions, 102 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL., 187 (1987) (examining the
present status of treatment for antisocial child behavior and identifying new alternative
approaches based on contemporary outcome research). See generally HENGGELER,
DELINQUENCY, supra note 57; Donald A. Gordon & Jack Arbuthnot Individual, Group,
and Family Interventions, in HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 290, 304 (Herbert
C. Quay ed., 1987); Pamela S. Howitt & Eugene Arthur Moore, Pay Now So You Won't
Pay Later: The Effectiveness of Prevention Programming in the Fight to Reduce
Delinquency, 44 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. No. 2, at 57 (1993) (describing community based
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multisystemic family preservation efforts conducted in community
settings have been extremely effective in reducing the institutionalization
and attenuating the criminal activity of even serious offenders.61 These
developments in social service delivery are significant. They support not
only the new family-focused, community-based approach, but also the
proposition that it is not impossible to rehabilitate delinquents.62
B. Economic Arguments
A most intriguing characteristic of juvenile justice agencies is their
general failure to conduct cost-benefit analyses. 63 Despite the establish-'
prevention programs and suggesting that they are one strategy to reduce the chance of
costly judicial intervention).
60. Multisystemic therapy (MST) addresses multiple correlates of delinquency that
have been demonstrated to characterize the family, peer, and educational settings of
delinquent youth. MST is intensive (the average duration of treatment is approximately
30 hours of direct contact over three months) and time limited (services range from 2 to
4 months) and directed toward familial and extrafamilial systems. See generally
HENGGELER & BoRDUIN, supra note 58.
61. Henggeler et al., Family Preservation, supra note 58, at 954. These benefits are
even more pronounced after 2.4 years of intervention. David A. Haapala & Jill M.
Kinney, Avoiding Out-of-Home Placement ofHigh-Risk Status Offenders Through the Use
of Intensive Home-Based Family Preservation Services, 15 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 334
(1988); Scott W. Henggeler et al., Family Preservation Using Multisystemic Treatment:
Long-Term Follow-up to a Clinical Trial with Serious Juvenile Offenders, 2 J. CHILD &
FAM. STUD. 283 (1993). Such intervention has been particularly effective with adolescent
sexual offenders and inner-city juvenile delinquents. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUvENILE JusTicE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, OJJDP MODEL PROGRAMS
1990, 3 (1992) (examining the efficacy of Targeted Outreach); Charles M. Borduin et al.,
Multisystemic Treatment of Adolescent Sexual Offenders, 34 INT'L J. OF OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMPARATIvE CRIMINOLOGY 105 (1990); Haapala & Kinney, supra, at 345
(reporting that out of 678 high-risk status offenders who received homebuilders services,
592 (87%) avoided out-of-home placement during a 12-month follow-up period); Scott W.
Henggeler et al., Multisystemic Treatment of Juvenile Offenders: Effects on Adolescent
Behavior and Family Interaction, 22 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 132 (1986)
(concluding that the multisystemic approach is a promising model of behavior disorders
and treatment). For a recent listing of major research on alternatives to institutionalization
for serious juvenile offenders, see JONES & KRiSBERG, supra note 4, at 36-40.
62. The juvenile justice system has historically been plagued by the premature
conclusion that "nothing works" in apparently futile attempts to rehabilitate youth. See
Theodore N. Ferdinand, History Overtakes the Juvenile Justice System, 37 CRIME &
DELINQ. 204 (1991) (offering a concise historical survey of the juvenile justice system's
failure to rehabilitate youth and reasons for these failures).
63. Cf Albert R. Roberts & Michael J. Camasso, Juvenile Offender Treatment
Programs and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 42 Juv. & FAM. CTJ. No. 1, at 37, 45 ("In view of
the millions of dollars spent annually to protect society, punish, care for, and rehabilitate
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ment's disregard for economic analysis, research demonstrates that the
cost of serving juveniles in their homes is considerably lower than the
cost of serving them through institutionalization. 6 One estimate, which
compares in-home placement programs that utilize intensive supervision
of youths with institutionalization, reports that in-home programs cost
approximately one-third as much as institutionalization. 5  Other
research shows that placements in mental health facilities are even more
expensive. 66  A number of recent studies have demonstrated the
effectiveness and economic advantages of intense, in-home family
preservation efforts.67  Such future monetary savings and averted
criminal justice costs demand consideration of policies aimed at helping
young offenders in their family environments.68
C. International Developments
When examining youths' rights to stay in their own families and
communities during rehabilitation efforts, policy makers must remember
that children are entitled to a decent, stable home environment. That
entitlement is a human right memorialized in international declarations
juvenile offenders, it is surprising that hardly any cost-benefit analysis studies have been
conducted by juvenile justice agencies.").
64. Id.
65. Barton & Butts, supra note 58 (suggesting that, notwithstanding the economic
benefits, policy reasons favor in-home rehabilitation over out-of-home rehabilitation
services). Barton and Butts present results of a five-year study in Michigan that compared
groups of juveniles randomly assigned to either in-home, intensive supervision, or
commitment. Id. at 238-39, 251.
66. See SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUsTICE, supra note 9, at 132-48.
67. Henggeler et al., Family Preservation, supra note 58, at 959; see also BARRY
KRISBERG & JAMES F. AusTIN, REINVENTINO JUVENILE JUSTICE 160-61 (1993) (describing
Massachusetts' experience in removing thousands of youngsters from training schools and
placing them in community programs and comparing the $170 spent per day for youths
in secure treatment to $23 per day for youth in nonresidential outreach and tracking
programs). Another recent study reported that, even without intensive family preservation
efforts, serious felony offenders who are not institutionalized but still under intensive
supervision, fair as well as others who were institutionalized. Wiebush, supra note 21, at
83-86. Moreover, these programs become more cost-effective as the programs increased
in size. Id.
68. See Kohl Testimony, supra note 50; Roberts & Camasso, supra note 63, at 42-45;
see also MARK H. MOORE, FROM CHILDREN TO CITIZENS: VOL I. THE MANDATE FOR
JUVENiLE JUSTICE 171, 171-88 (1987).
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and conventions,69 and its significance is reflected in the United
Nations' declaration of 1994 as the International Year of the Family.
That year highlighted the importance of the family and its role in
promoting healthy behavior.7"
In addition to recognizing the rights and duties of children and
families, the United Nations recently adopted The Riyadh Guidelines,
which are aimed at delinquency prevention.7  These guidelines
demonstrate the international community's renewed focus on families72
and communities,73 and its continued belief that young people should
be institutionalized only as a last resort.74 This new international ethos
in juvenile justice reflects recent changes several countries have made in
their approaches to juvenile justice.75
69. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448
(1989). The Convention establishes childrens' rights to: a family environment, "a full and
decent life," and "a standard of living adequate to the child's physical, mental, spiritual,
moral and social development." Id. at preamble, Art. 23, art. 27; see also Levesque,
Children's Rights Grow Up, supra note 32, at 212-17 (detailing the substantive language
of the Convention).
70. See generally Levesque, American Adolescents, supra note 35, at 278 n.203.
71. United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh
Guidelines), Dec. 14, 1990 resol. 45/112 in HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 346-55.
72. Id. at 348. Section IV(A)(12) of the Riyadh Guidelines states:
Since the family is the central unit responsible for the primary socialization of
children, governmental and social efforts to preserve the integrity of the family,
including the extended family, should be pursued. The society has a responsibility
to assist the family in providing care and protection and in ensuring the physical and
mental well-being of children.
Id.
73. Id. at 351, § IV(C)(32) ("Community-based services and programs which respond
to the special needs, problems, interests and concerns of young persons and which offer
appropriate counselling and guidance to young persons and their families should be
developed, or strengthened where they exist.").
74. Id. at 352, § V(46) ("The institutionalization of young persons should be a measure
of last resort and for the minimum necessary period, and the best interests of the young
person should be of paramount importance.").
75. A frequently cited example of these international changes is the recent approach
taken by New Zealand. New Zealand's Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act
of 1989 provides a new mandate for juvenile justice that emphasizes the following
principles: involving families injuvenilejustice decisions; keeping children in their homes;
strengthening and maintaining child-family relationships; and promoting the development
of the child in the family. See Allison Morris & Gabrielle M. Maxwell, Juvenile Justice
in New Zealand: A New Paradigm, 26 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 72, 72-73, 75-78,
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The international movement has important repercussions for
American policy. The United States' traditional hostility toward human
rights treaties is fading, as demonstrated by the United States' recent
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
6
By ratifying the covenant, the United States demonstrated its willingness
to comply with internationally developed norms and, more importantly,
to protect families and juveniles. The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights explicitly protects families' and proposes a justice system that
contains special procedures for juveniles designed to "promot[e] their
rehabilitation."'78
D. General Policy Considerations
Finally, public policy goals demand that policy makers consider the
human benefits of avoiding institutionalization. Even if the costs and
general efficacy of the punitive, out-of-home-community and rehabilita-
tive, in-home-community options were equivalent, and if states ignored
the rights and treatment needs of children, basic values would dictate a
preference for in-home rehabilitation. Obvious social benefits derive
from programs that reduce crime because of the high human costs of
victimization. It is just as important, however, to avoid the unnecessary
social cost that may arise from an out-dated, inefficient rehabilitation
system. Wise public policy demands supporting family integrity,
minimizing restrictions on liberty, and limiting intrusions on the privacy
84-89 (1992) (explaining the importance of these provisions).
76. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). The United States adopted and ratified the
Covenant in 1992. See White House Statement on Signing the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1008 (June 5, 1992).
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 76, Art. 23 ("The
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State.').
78. Id. Art. 14(4) ("In the case ofjuvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will
take account of their ages and the desirability of promoting rehabilitation."). Note,
however, that the United States placed a reservation on article 14(4), which reserved the
right to treat juveniles as adults in "exceptional circumstances." S. ExEc. REP. No. 23,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1992); see also David P. Stewart, United States Ratification
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations,
Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1183, 1183-84, 1195 (1993)
(detailing the significance of the United States' ratification, as well as the reservation
placed on the juvenile justice provisions).
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of youths and their families.79 The soundness of this philosophy is
reflected in an important line of research which documents the intuitively
obvious necessity of establishing a justice system that both its partici-
pants and society perceive as "just."80
IV. THE STATUS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN STATE FAMILY
PRESERVATION MOVEMENTS
All fifty states provide for in-home placement of juvenile
offenders, typically as a statutory dispositional alternative open to the
juvenile courts.s Over half of the juvenile court acts, by their own
terms, "shall be liberally construed to the end that each child under the
jurisdiction of the court shall receive, preferably in the child's own home,
the care, guidance and control that will best serve the child's welfare and
the best interest of the state."' These provisions, however, are merely
boilerplate guidelines, duplicating the language of the Uniform Juvenile
Court Act. They are not substantive directives that order juvenile
79. See Henggeler et al., Family Preservation, supra note 58, at 959; see also Melton,
New World Order, supra note 24, at 514-15 (arguing that the family preservation
movement adopts a focus that compliments the widely accepted societal values of
protecting family integrity).
80. For an authoritative analysis of the importance of certain forms of procedures in
the justice system which help encourage certain behaviors, see generally TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw (1990). See also E. Allan Lind & P. Christopher Earley,
Procedural Justice and Culture, 27 INT'L J. PsYCHOLOGY 227, 22740 (1992) (succinctly
reviewing the "procedural justice literature," the manner in which people evaluate the
fairness of social decision-making procedures, and demonstrating its cross-cultural
significance).
81. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
82. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.1 (West 1994); see also, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
246(4) (1993). The Nebraska Juvenile Code is to be construed:
To achieve [its purpose] in the juvenile's own home whenever possible, separating
the juvenile from his or her parent when necessary for his or her welfare or in the
interest of public safety and, when temporary separation is necessary, to consider the
developmental needs of the individual juvenile in all placements and to assure every
reasonable effort to reunite the juvenile and his or her family.
Id.
83. The act is to be read "to achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment
whenever possible, separating the child from his parents only when necessary for his
welfare or in the interests of public safety." UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 1(3), 9A
U.L.A. 4 (1987). The Act has been adopted in full by only three states - Georgia, North
Dakota, and Pennsylvania. Id. at 1.
One state, however, incorporated the Uniform Act's focus on community empowerment
and has become a model. The objectives of Oregons' Community Juvenile Services Acts
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courts to utilize existing community- and home-based resources.
Although juvenile codes often do not contain substantive directives
mandating the use of home- and community-based resources, a large
number of state statutes express preferences for in-home treatment of
troubled youth and for family preservation." Unfortunately, these
statutes are a recent phenomenon and remain uninterpreted by appellate
courts. The relative inattention given to these statutes provides us with
are as follows:
(1) The family unit shall be preserved;
(2) Intervention shall be limited to those actions which are necessary and utilize the
least restrictive and most effective and appropriate resources;
(3) The family shall be encouraged to participate actively in whatever treatment is
affbrded a child;
(4) Treatment in the community, rather than commitment to a state juvenile training
school, shall be provided whenever possible; and
(5) Communities shall be encouraged and assisted in the development of alternatives
to secure temporary custody for children who are not eligible for secure detention.
OL- REv. STAT. § 417A10 (1987). The program has improved juvenile justice by
decreasing the number of at-risk youth who enter the system. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUvENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, OJJDP JUvENILE
JUSTICE BULLETIN (1990). The focus, however, has typically been on community
involvement by providing more shelters, specialized foster care, runaway projects, and
services for street youth. Juvenile Justice: A New Focus on Prevention: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Juvenile Justice, 102nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 32, 36 (1992) (testimony of Thomas R. English, Executive Director of the Oregon
Council on Crime and Delinquency).
84. This Article will not discuss family preservation acts which explicitly excluded
delinquent youth. See, e.g., Alabama's Individual and Family Support Program, ALA.
CODE §§ 38-9A-1 to -8 (Supp. 1994) (applying only to families and persons with a
developmental disability); Arizona's Family Support Program, Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-596.51-.57 (1993) (applying only to families with developmentally disabled children);
Louisiana's Community and Family Support System Act, LA. REV. STAT. § 28:821-:824
(West Supp. 1995) (providing in home and family services for persons with developmental
disabilities); Maine's Family Support Services Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 1802
(West Supp. 1994) (focusing on providing in-home, family based services for children with
disabilities); The Oklahoma Family Support Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 603 (West
1992) (preventing or delaying "out-of-home placement of children with severe develop-
mental disabilities"); Wisconsin's Family Support Program, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.985
(West 1987 & Supp. 1993) (focusing on enabling the parents of disabled children to care
for their disabled children in their homes rather than placing the children in institutions or
other out-of-home placements).
Nor will the Article discuss recent family support statutes aimed primarily at the special
needs of families with infants and toddlers. See, e.g., Illinois' Early Intervention Services
System Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 325, para. 20 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Mississippi's Early
Intervention Act for Infants and Toddlers, MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-87-1 to -19 (1993);
Rhode Island's Family Support Program, RI. GEN. LAWS. § 42-72.2-1 to .2-6 (1993).
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the opportunity to explore how they may be used to revise the juvenile
justice system.
A. Statutes Arguably Including Delinquent Youth
Many states' family preservation statutes, while not expressly
extending in-home services to those in the juvenile justice system,
arguably apply to delinquent youth. For instance, while Florida's statute,
on its face, appears limited to children already in foster or shelter
care,85 it also explicitly states that the program will provide "[e]ffective
treatment to address [the] physical, social, and emotional needs" of all
families. 6 These needs arguably could result from delinquent behav-
ior.' Similarly, other statutes offer home-based services when parents
lack the ability to control their children."8 Such uncontrollable behavior
might include juvenile delinquency. Still other statutes apply "to all
children and families who have need of services, or who, by their
circumstances or actions, have violated the laws, rules, or regulations of
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.803 (West 1993) (enumerating the services provided to
"children in shelter and foster care," or to "facilities which provide such care," but not to
delinquent children removed from their homes).
86. Id. § 409.802.
87. See 1993 FLA. LAWS ch. 200. In 1993, a Florida House Bill revamped the
juvenile justice system by creating the Community Juvenile Justice System Act of 1993,
which states the legislature's intent that institutional resources and community-based
resources be managed to facilitate a community-based continuum of care. Id. Although
the statute targets the community, the statute also aims to preserve, rehabilitate, and reunite
families by providing home-based care. Id. The bill explicitly states that it is the "policy
of the state to provide a family-centered constellation of services [and that the] primary
goal of these services in the preservation of families." Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 66-
26 to -35 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1994) (developing and supervising delinquency
prevention programs).
88. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-16-106(a) (Michie 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.590(l)(c) (Baldwin 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2174(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994).
The Kentucky statute also expressly states that the "implementation of family
preservation services shall be limited to those situations where protection can be assured
for children, families, and the community." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.590(3) (Baldwin
1991). Likewise, the statute strictly prohibits family services when "children are at risk
of recurring sexual abuse perpetrated by a member of their immediate household who
remains in close physical proximity to the victim or whose continued safety from recurring
abuse cannot be reasonably assured;" and to "families in which one or more adults in the
immediate household are drug or alcohol dependent and not in active treatment for such
dependency." Id. § 200.590(2)(a), (b).
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the state and are found to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation
"89
The goals of the family preservation statutes vary from state to
state." Some attempt to pre-empt juvenile and family problems.9
Others strive to serve the best interests of the children9 and the
89. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-532(2) (1993).
90. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-546.A.5 (Supp. 1994) (developing a
protective services program which seeks "to prevent dependency, abuse and exploitation
of children" and provides "social services to stabilize family life, and to preserve the
family unit .. ."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.801 (West 1993) ("The primary goal of the
Legislature is to protect, preserve, and enhance the stability and quality of Florida's
families ... [and] to prevent family dysfunction and the loss of family independence.');
MD. ANN. CODE. art. 49D §§ 2(a), 38(a) (1994) ("promot[ing] a stable, safe, and healthy
environment for children and families, thereby increasing self-sufficiency and family
preservation" and calling for "family preservation services that [promote] the integrity of
the family and avoid inappropriate out-of-home placements" because inappropriate out-of-
home placements have the deleterious effect of "increas[ing] costs to the State and
diminish[ing] the ability of a parent to care adequately for the child"); MNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 256F.01 (West 1992) (outlining a state policy "to assure that all children, regardless of
minority racial or ethnic heritage, live in families that offer a safe, permanent relationship
with nurturing parents or caretakers," and directing public social services toward
"preventing the unnecessary separation of children from their families by identifying
family problems, assisting families in resolving their problems, and preventing breakup of
the family if it is desirable and possible"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-7-102(1) (1993)
(aiming "to support and preserve the family as the single most powerful influence for
ensuring the healthy social development and mental and physical well-being of Montana's
children"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-535 (1993) (declaring that "the family is the backbone
of Nebraska and its is in the best interest of Nebraska to solidify, preserve, strengthen, and
maintain the family unit"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-74.a (West Supp. 1994) ('The
obligation of the State to preserve the sanctity of the family and prevent the placement of
children outside the home should be fulfilled in the context of a clear and consistent policy
which emphasizes the strengthening of families through the application of intensive family
preservation services....').
91. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.002.2(4) (1994) (directing state agencies to "[flocus
resources on social and health problems as they begin to manifest themselves, rather than
waiting for chronic and severe patterns of illness, criminality, and dependency to
develop"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-7-102(2)(a)(ii) (1993) (promoting a policy directed
toward "assisting vulnerable families before crises emerge by providing specialized
services to strengthen and preserve families experiencing problems before they become
acute and by providing early intervention and family support services").
92. The Nebraska Act plans to obtain the following objectives:
(a) Preservation of the family unit whenever the best interests of the juvenile require
it,
(b) Limitation on intervention to those actions which are necessary and the utilization
of the least restrictive yet most effective and appropriate resources;
(c) Encouragement of active family participation in whatever treatment is afforded
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community3' by improving parenting skills' and providing services
in the least restrictive environment.95 The ultimate goal is family
preservation,96 reunification,' or permanent alternative placement.98
Pennsylvania's Family Preservation Act of 19899 provides the
most powerful statement against out-of-home placement. The Act
bluntly states that the family is a "basic institution in society"' and
that out-of-home placements sever unique bonds and leave "emotional
scars on... children which may never fully heal."..' Notwithstanding
a juvenile whenever the best interests of the juvenile require it;
(d) Treatment in the community rather than commitment to a youth rehabilitation and
treatment center whenever the best interests of the juvenile require it; and
(e) Encouragement of and assistance to communities in the development of
alternatives to secure temporary custody for juveniles who do not require secure
detention.
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 43-2403(4)(a)-(e); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-74(c) (West
Supp. 1994).
93. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-7-102(2)(a)(i) (1993) (establishing children and
family services that provide a "community network [which] offers a range of family
support services, activities, and programs designed to promote family well-being"); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 43-532(1) (1993) (recognizing "that children develop their unique potential
in relation to a caring social unit, usually the family, and other nurturing environments,
especially the schools and community').
94. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-546.A.5 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-16-
102(3)(B)-(C) (Michie 1993).
95. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200.595(3) (Baldwin 1994) ("No family preservation
services program shall compel any family member to engage in any activity or refrain
from any activity which is not reasonably related to remedying a condition or conditions
that gave rise or which could reasonably give rise to any finding of child abuse, neglect
or dependency'); see also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-532(1), -2403(a)-(e) (1993).
96. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-2403(4)(a).
97. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 409.801 - 409.803 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995)
(offering a range of services to children in order to facilitate reunification); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 256F.01(2)-(4) (West 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-246(4) (1993) (requiring that
reasonable efforts be made in order to achieve reunification); id. § 45-533(4) (requiring
reuniting the juvenile in a time flame appropriate to the juvenile's age and developmental
needs).
98. In Minnesota, when restoring families is not possible or appropriate, state agencies
will attempt to place children in suitable adoptive homes and ensure adequate care of
children when they cannot be placed for adoption. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256F.01(2)-(4)
(West 1992).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 2171-2175 (Supp. 1994).
100. Id. § 2172(a)(1).
101. Id. § 2172(a)(3).
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the deep commitment of foster parents, the Pennsylvania legislature
explained "that children are better off emotionally when their needs can
be met by their biological parents."1 2
The services provided under the family preservation statutes also
differ from state to state. These services range from parenting class-
es"03 to a "continuum of care"'' °4 in the "least restrictive environ-
ment." 5  Some programs provide "direct therapeutic services"' "° or
individualized treatment"° based on specifically outlined service
criteria.'0"
The scope of rights afforded under general family preservation
statutes varies widely. In many statutes, family preservation initiatives
begin when a child is in immediate or imminent risk of out-of-home
102. Id. § 2171(a)(4).
103. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
104. While Maryland's family preservation statute calls for home-based treatment, see
supra note 90, it is not clear what services will ultimately be involved, because the new
policy is only in the planning phase. According to § 38(b)(3), the plan shall include:
(i) A schedule for phasing in family preservation services with a goal that, as
resources are made available, all families determined to be suitable for these services
after July 1, 1995 shall receive them;
(ii) Descriptions of the types of children and families who shall receive family
preservation services;
(iii) Descriptions of the types of family preservation services available;
(iv) Descriptions of the situations in which the family preservation services available
would not be appropriate.
MD. ANN. CODE § 38(bX3) (1994).
Regardless of the form the family preservation program takes, it must "provide a
continuum of care that is family and child oriented... [and] which gives priority to
children and families most at risk." Id. § 2(b)(2).
105. See supra note 95 and accompanying text
106. The Arkansas legislation "provides direct therapeutic services to families in
accordance with family preservation models as prescribed by policy." ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-16-102(3)(B) (Michie 1993).
107. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:287.2.A(3) (West Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4C-77 (West Supp. 1994).
108. The New Jersey Act states that family preservation is based on the principles that:
1) children's safety is always the first concern; 2) "children should be raised by their own
families whenever possible;" and 3) "intervention should build on family strengths and be
responsive to family needs." NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-74.C(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1994).
The act also outlines certain criteria for family preservation programs. The criteria concern
family preservation services, the development of manuals, the development of a Family
Preservation Services Coordinating Unit, and annual reports documenting costs, the number
of participating families, and effectiveness. Id. §§ 30:4C-77 to -81.
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placement."°  Others do not establish any entitlement to services,
leaving the question of what to do to preserve families to the political
and budgetary process."0  The strongest statutes, establish "bills of
rights,""' which provide considerable protections for families,"'
limit the intrusiveness of preservation efforts,"' and establish childrens'
rights to permanent lifetime relationships" 14 that preserve their racial or
ethnic heritage." 5
109. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-16-106(a) (Michie 1993); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.580 (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:287.2.A (West Supp. 1995); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2174(e)(2) (Supp. 1994).
110. Louisiana's statute explicitly states that it does not "create an entitlement [to
family preservation or in-home services] nor [does it]... createjudicial authority to order
the provision of family preservation services .... ." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:287.2.C
(West Supp. 1995). Subject to the availability of funds, the Louisiana legislature bestowed
discretionary authority upon the Department of Social Services to implement family
preservation services according to its own plan and time frame. Id. § 46:287.2.B; see also
id. §§ 46:287.5 .A-.D.
Similarly, Montana's statute explicitly states that it should "not be construed to require
a service or particular level of services or to grant a right of action to enforce this section
or other law." MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-7-102(3) (1993).
111. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-16-107(b)-(c) (1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.595 (Baldwin 1991).
112. For example, Kentucky's family preservation statute provides that:
Acceptance of family preservation services shall not be considered an admission of
any allegation that initiated the investigation of the family, nor shall refusal of family
preservation services be considered as evidence in any proceeding except where the
issue is whether the Cabinet for Human Resources has made reasonable efforts to
prevent removal of a child.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200.595(2) (Baldwin 1991); see also id. § 200.595(3) ("No family
preservation services program shall compel any family member to engage in any activity
or refrain from any activity which is not reasonably related to remedying a condition or
conditions that gave rise or which could reasonably give rise to any finding of child abuse,
neglect or dependency.").
113. See supra notes 98 and 114 and accompanying text.
114. The Minnesota Family Preservation Act outlines a state policy "to assure that all
children, regardless of minority racial or ethnic heritage, live in families that offer a safe,
permanent relationship with nurturing parents or caretakers." MINN. STAT. AN.
§ 256F.01 (West 1992). To ensure that children are able to establish lifetime relationships,
the Act requires that public social services be directed toward "preventing the unnecessary
separation of children from their families by identifying family problems, assisting families
in resolving their problems, and preventing breakup of the family if it is desirable and
possible." Id. § 256F.02.
115. The Minnesota statute includes a statement which explicitly requires that
prevention and family reunification services to minorities "must reflect and support family
models that are accepted within the culture of the particular minority." Id. § 256F.03
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B. Statutes Expressly Including Delinquent Youth
Seven states" 6 have passed family preservation statutes that
explicitly extend in-home services to families with children in the
juvenile justice system."7 While differing in scope and application,
these statutes share the common goal of preventing family dissolu-
tion."" To achieve this goal, the statutes require a variety of home-
subd. 8; see also Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.35-
.3579 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
116. Colorado, Goergia, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee and West
Virginia. The Georgia legislature enacted a family preservation statute. However, the
Georgia Family Preservation and Child Protection Act contained a sunset provision,
effective January 1, 1993. The legislature did not renew the Act and all provisions were
repealed. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-200 to 49-5-209 (1994), repealed by 1990 Ga. Law
1986. § 2.
117. See CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-5.5-104(2)(b) (West Supp. 1994) (stating that
intensive preservation efforts will be available to all appropriate families involved in the
child welfare, mental health, and juvenile justice systems); NEV. REV. STAT. § 232.400(3)
(1993) (requiring the newly-formed Division of Child and Family Services to "develop
standards for carrying out programs aimed toward the prevention of delinquent acts of
children" and programs for their treatment); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-17-3.A to -3.E
(Michie 1993) (including delinquent children in definition of those at risk for out-of-home
placement, thereby qualifying their families for in-home services); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143B-150.6(b) (1993) (extending eligibility for in-home services to "children ages 0-17
years who are at risk of imminent separation through placement in public welfare, mental
health, orjuvenilejustice systems") (emphasis added); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-3-602(1)(D)
(1991) (stating that a risk of out-of-home placement may result from dependency, abuse,
or neglect, emotional disturbance, family conflict or a delinquency adjudication); W.VA.
CODE §§ 49-2D-3, -2D-6 (1992) (requiring a hearing to determine whether "reasonable
efforts have been made to stabilize and maintain the family situation" prior to removing
a child because of "abuse, neglect, dependency or delinquency or any emotional and
behavioral problems") (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-5.5-102(l)(a) (West Supp. 1994)
("Maintaining a family structure to the greatest degree possible is one of the fundamental
goals that all state agencies must observe.. . -"); id. § 26-5.5-102(1)(d) (viewing family
preservation services as "an opportunity to initiate the systemic reforms of children, youth,
and families [sic] public services by providing services that are family-focused, outcome-
driven, and cost-efficient. ... '); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-17-4.B(3) (Michie 1993)
(striving to solve "practical problems that contribute to family stress, so as to affect
improved parental performance and enhanced functioning of the family unit"); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143B-150.5(b) (1993) (attempting "to keep the family unit intact by providing
intensive family-centered services that help create, within the family, positive, long-term
changes in the home environment"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-3-603(a) (1991) (requiring
the delivery of services which are "reasonably expected to avoid out-of-home placement
and also afford effective protection of the child, the family, and the community"); W. VA.
CODE § 49-2D-1 (1994) (finding a need to "assist dysfunctional families by providing
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based services to prevent the unnecessary removal of delinquent children.
The procedural protections afforded to children vary under these
family preservation statutes. In New Mexico, for example, the in-home
services requirement begins when a "child may reasonably be expected
to face out-of-home placement."'1 9 Other states, however, do not
require home-based services until an actual or imminent risk of out-of-
home placement develops. 2° Additionally, most states do not guaran-
tee children procedural due process protections. While many states
require that rehabilitation occur in the "least restrictive environ-
ment,"' 2' only West Virginia requires a hearing to ensure that all
reasonable efforts have been made to stabilize the family before a child
my be placed outside the home."
The actual services provided to children and families differ from
state to state. Most states require short-term, intensive, home-based
services.' Many statutes do not specify the exact services to be
provided, while others outline comprehensive service packages. For
example, New Mexico's statute authorizes services ranging from
nurture and care to such families' children as an alternative to removing children from
such families").
119. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-17-2 (Michie 1993).
120. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-150.6(b) (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-3-
603(a) (1991).
121. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-5.5-102 (West Supp. 1994) ("[tlhe state's
intervention in family dynamics should not exceed that which is necessary to rectify the
cause for intervention."). The principle of "least restrictive environment" is implicit in this
codification of restraint. See also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 232A00(l)(c) (Michie 1991)
(specifying that when out-of-home placement is unavoidable, children are to be placed in
the "least restrictive environment available which is appropriate to their needs').
122. W. VA. CODE § 49-2D-3 (1992). The required hearing is waived if the child is
in "imminent danger of serious bodily or emotional injury or death." Id.
123. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-17-2 (Michie 1993) (specifying the provision of
"short-term, intensive services provided to a family whose child may reasonably be
expected to face out-of-home placement"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-150.5(b) (1993)
(requiring "intensive family-centered services that help create, within the family, positive,
long-term changes in the home environment"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-3-602(2) (1991)
(describing the required services as "short-term, highly intensive services" designed to aid
a family by keeping it intact and caring for the child at home); cf W.VA. CODE § 49-2D-
2(b) (1992) (requiring either intensive, short-term "home-based family preservation
services" or "[hjome-based, longer term after care following intensive intervention"
intended to stabilize and maintain the natural or surrogate family in order to prevent the
placement of children in substitute care).
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emergency cash grants to basic support services. 24 Other statutes
establish a floor of minimal services," and some merely call for the
development of program standards.'26 Tennessee is alone in establish-
ing follow-up mechanisms to evaluate the cost-effectiveness and success
of keeping children at home.' 27
While not uniform, statutes that explicitly provide for family
preservation in the juvenile justice system embrace the family preserva-
tion movement by recognizing the similarity between nonviolent juvenile
offenders and other child welfare clients. By focusing on rehabilitation,
not punishment, these statutes are models for the appropriate integration
of juvenile offenders into the family preservation movement.
IV. REvISIONING JUVENILE JUSTICE
This Article examined a new movement in child welfare and
illustrated its applicability to the juvenile justice system. After examin-
ing several theoretical and practical considerations, this Article proposed
that extending the new family preservation movement to juvenile justice
124. New Mexico's statute authorizes a comprehensive package of services, including
"child care, education and training, emergency cash grants, state and federally funded
public assistance or any other basic support or social service appropriate for the family."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-17-4.B(4) (Michie 1993). These services are limited "to the
extent of available resources." Id.
125. See CoLO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 26-5.5-104(3) (West Supp. 1994) (enumerating
minimal services and when they are to be provided).
126. Nevada centralized child and family services to accomplish the following goals:
(1) The diagnosis and assessment of the needs of particular children and families,
including those in need of multiple services;
(2) The referral of children and families to appropriate services; and
(3) The management and monitoring of cases in which the children and families are
referred to multiple services.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 232.400(2Xa) (Michie 1993). The purposes of the new centralized
service system is to "[m]aintain the integrity of families" and "[e]nsure that children are
not unnecessarily removed from their homes." Id. § 232.400(2)(b) (1)-(2). Nevada
directed its efforts toward family preservation, rehabilitation, and reunification. Id.
§ 232.400(l)(b).
127. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-3-604 (1991) (requiring evaluation of the effectiveness
of the programs after one, two and three years). Georgia also required follow-up studies
to report the number of families receiving services, the number of children in out-of-home
placement, the cost of providing out-of-home services, and the number of children who
remain with their families after one, two and three years. GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-202(f)
(1990), repealed by 1990 Ga. Laws p. 1986, §2. The reports from the pilot projects were
to be used to consider the feasibility of state-wide implementation.
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would help alleviate the "youth problem." The new family preservation
statutes provide a legal context for pursuing these innovative
dispositional strategies. Several statutes target delinquent children as a
group that needs family-focused and community-based attention.'
Including delinquent youth in the family preservation movement is
momentous. Legal rules and policies relating to social services and
juvenile justice remain within state jurisdiction, with the federal
government providing some minimal standards and guidelines.'29 Any
widespread shift away from current, punitive models of juvenile justice
must begin in state legislatures. By explicitly expanding the scope of the
family preservation movement, several states have initiated an important
shift.
Despite the promise these family preservation statutes show,
however, they may become useless. These statutes could become yet
another much-heralded event in child welfare that eventually proves
ineffective. It has become cliche to suggest that policy makers and
professionals representing the law, social services, and mental health
must work together to develop integrated, in-home programs for children
in trouble. 30 As we have seen, the coordination of services that result
in effective, in-home rehabilitation practices is no longer just good public
policy - increasingly, it is becoming the law.
128. See supra part IV.B. Other statutes indirectly include delinquent youth through
provisions aimed at families with children in conflict or families that have trouble
controlling their children. See supra part W.A.
129. See supra part IT.
130. See, e.g., Mark Soler & Carole Shauffer, Fighting Fragmentation: Coordination
of Services for Children and Families, 69 NEB. L. REV. 278 (1990). For a discussion of
the types of problems likely to be encountered in integrating services across agencies and
disciplines, see Brian Sarata & Dave Provorse, Tiying to Remodel the Children and Youth
Service System: Observations About Barriers and Opportunities, 9 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 143
(1991) (discussing the intergovernmental planning process that occurred as one of the
primary steps in implementing the Family Policy Act in Nebraska).
Attorneys have an ethical obligation to inform juvenile courts of the need for in-home
dispositional alternatives. See John L. Roche, Juvenile Court Dispositional Alternatives:
Imposing a Duty on the Defense, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 279, 283-86 (1987). Even
though the new statutes may not have much "bite," the presence of these laws facilitate
successful negotiation for outcomes that otherwise might not have been available. See
generally Robert D. Cooter, et al, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model
of Strategic Behavior, 11 . LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950 (1979) (evaluating divorce law as a framework for negotiation).
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